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[T]he Divisional Returning Officer [is now] the very centre of life and 
authority from which all the active, motive, administrating power 
emanates… From the time you accept the responsibilities and privileges of 
the position, you are the directing, controlling power… you become the 
Electoral King. 
— George Lewis, the first Commonwealth Chief Electoral Officer, addressing his NSW returning officers 
in Sydney in 1903 (italics added)1  
 
 
The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), the body that runs national elections and 
referendums in this country, is rightly held in high regard around the world. Last year, for 
example, the Economist magazine’s “Democracy Index” awarded full marks (ten out of ten) 
on the criterion “Electoral Process and Pluralism” to only nine countries, including 
Australia.2 The renowned British academic and psephologist David Butler once declared, 
after observing an Australian electoral event, that “countries could do no better than to 
follow this model”3 At every election since 1996, the AEC has hosted visitors from around 
the world to observe efficiency and non-partisanship in action – to see how elections 
should be run.4 
 
But nothing is perfect, and the AEC has a serious structural problem. A century ago, this 
feature of our system could have been described as “world’s best practice” – it was a 
major reason Australia led the world in electoral administration. Now it is the opposite, 
holding the organisation back from fully adapting to modern realities. It is inappropriate 
to the task of conducting modern elections and becomes less appropriate with every 
passing year. And the reason this impediment persists, perhaps ironically for a body with 
a proud record of immunity from political influence, is our politicians – of all major 
parties. 
 
So what is the problem? It was identified as long ago as 1974, in a report on the operation 
of the then Electoral Office by consultants WD Scott and Co. The Scott Report found 
much to praise in the organisation, but also much that needed improving. Under the 
heading “Organisational Problems,” it described what it believed was biggest drawback: 
its “very ‘flat’ structure” – namely, the fact that:  
                                                
1 National Archives of Australia (1903). Conference of Divisional Returning Officers, 17 October 1903. 
A406/E1903/7743, 4 
2 The Economist (2007). The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy. London. The other countries were 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and Uruguay. 
http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf, last visited 16 April 2008 
3 Parapraphrased in: Centre for Democratic Institutions. (1998). “Australian Election Seminar for International 
Observers Invited by the Australian Electoral Commission.” from http://www.cdi.anu.edu.au/CDIwebsite_1998-
2004/asia_pacific/asia_downloads/aesOct98.rtf. 
4 In 2007, 54 visitors came from 18 countries, as well as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Those countries were Afghanistan, Canada, East Timor, India, 
Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, PNG, Solomon Islands, South 
Africa, UK and USA.  
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[t]here are 124 DROs [Divisional Returning Officers] reporting to six AEOs 
[Australian Electoral Officers – one for each state] who report to the CAEO [Chief 
Australian Electoral Officer, in Canberra]… This flat structure, the result of a 
highly decentralised organisation, is causing problems in the Divisions[.]5 
 
The position of returning officer is part of our British inheritance and many centuries old. 
Traditionally they were the people who organised elections in each seat, taking and 
counting the votes and declaring the winner. This remains an accurate description of 
returning officers in many countries such as the United Kingdom today. What makes 
Australia unique is that our returning officers don’t just work at and around election time, 
but permanently. Each divisional office operates all year, every year, occupying itself with 
enrolment and electoral redistributions6 and in general servicing their electorates. And at 
election time, of course, they do what returning officers in other countries do: organise 
the taking of votes and count them. (Afterwards they return the election writ with the 
name(s) of elected candidate(s) – hence the name “returning officer.”)  
 
At the time of the Scott Report, each divisional office had two permanent staff – a 
divisional returning officer and a clerk – and could employ a temporary clerk at certain 
times. Today each office has three full-time staff including the DRO.7 
 
So when the report’s authors described the Electoral Office as “flat” they meant it was 
three units high and 124 units wide. Noting that “[a]n election for the House of 
Representatives can in some ways be considered as 127 separate elections,”8 the report 
found divisional office staff were often overstretched, suffered stress and low morale and 
had poor prospects for promotion. Each small unit had a degree of “self sufficiency” 
which “brought it own problems.”9 They were unsuited to the cyclical nature of the work 
– frantic periods of high activity, for example at election time, followed by periods of 
calm. Being “geographically isolated” they experienced communication difficulties with 
state offices, and the quality of staff varied, which had powerful repercussions in such 
small teams.  
 
To rectify this, the report recommended a system of “regionalisation,” in which staff 
would be pooled and “four of five DROs would be under the control of a regional 
manager”10 (implying approximately 25 to 30 regional offices in total). Many of the Scott 
Report’s other recommendations were acted upon, but not this one.  
                                                
5 W.D. Scott & Co. Pty Ltd (Management Consultants) (1974). Review of the Structure, Systems & Facilities of the Australian 
Electoral Office, Australian Electoral Office, 4-5. The number of DROs is given as 124 rather than 127 because the ACT 
and Northern Territory electorates did not have their own DROs. 
6 Redistributions are the regular altering of boundaries that take account of changing populations. 
7 This perhaps oversimplifies the situation. Convoluted arrangements, including the sharing of staff, means that 
according to the AEC they have 3.2 staff per office. 
8 W.D. Scott & Co. Pty Ltd (Management Consultants). 3.6. The difference between 124 in reference 5 and the 127 
mentioned here is due to the two ACT and one NT seats not having DROs. 
9 Ibid, 4-2 
10 Ibid, 8-1 
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Since 1984, however, when the Office became a Commission, it has attempted repeatedly 
to adopt such reforms, with limited success. Perhaps the most determined attempt was 
contained in a 1987 report written by the AEC, called Efficiency Scrutiny into Regionalisation. 
The Hawke government had issued a directive to all federal agencies to identify cost-
saving areas, and in this context the AEC put what it probably thought was a compelling 
argument. At the time it was preparing to “introduce a modern computer system” 
throughout the whole organisation, which meant a large, expensive exercise of installing 
computers and equipment in every office around the country, networked to the central 
offices. It argued that by replacing the (then) 148 divisional offices with 47 regional ones, 
it would save a very substantial amount of money on computer equipment alone, not to 
mention many other economies of scale.11 
 
The mooted savings were impressive, but the DROs didn’t like the plan, and nor did 
federal politicians who, in the form of the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral 
Matters, rejected it.12 Since then, a regular pattern can be seen: every so often the AEC 
proposes cutting the number of offices, or indeed begins cutting them, and the 
government of the day (generally with the support of the opposition) eventually puts a 
halt. 
 
Why are politicians against such plans? It is actually only those in the House of 
Representatives (who outnumber senators two to one) who object, and one reason was 
identified in the 1974 report: “the rather subjective desire of elected Members and 
candidates to have a convenient local office to serve the electorate.”13 It seems the DROs 
have some influence on their local MPs, and some are said to be in regular contact. As 
well, the same popular forces that can be motivated against the closing of branches of 
institutions such as banks and post offices in regional communities can be harnessed 
against the closing of the local AEC branch. (It must be noted, however, that most people 
rarely, if ever, visit their local AEC office.) 
 
The attempts by the AEC to rationalise geographically have not been wholly 
unsuccessful. Today a total of 158 units (Central Office in Canberra, one in each state 
capital and in the Northern Territory14 plus 150 divisions) are housed in only 120 
buildings. But this is way short of the 48 suggested in 1987. At each step, the very people 
we would expect to stay out of electoral administration – the elected politicians – stand in 
the way of further reorganisation.  
 
                                                
11 Australian Electoral Commission (1987). Efficiency Scrutiny into Regionalisation. Canberra, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, i 
12 See Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (1988). Is This Where I Pay the Electricity Bill?: Inquiry on the efficiency 
scrutiny into regionalisation within the Australian Electoral Commission, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. 
13 W.D. Scott & Co. Pty Ltd (Management Consultants), 3-4 – 3-5 
14 The ACT does not have a head office, presumably because the Central Office is located there. 
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This ongoing battle has produced almost comical manoeuvrings. Having been told in 
1988 in no uncertain terms not to pursue “regionalisation,” the Commission instead 
embarked on a policy of “amalgamation,” When, after some progress, that too was put to 
the sword, the buzzwords became “shared premises” and then “collocation.” The 
difference tends to lie in the degree to which each divisional office retains its own identity. 
Collocation, the current model, could be described as the weakest, essentially meaning 
several electoral offices geographically housed together, thereby saving on overheads, but 
each still operating as an individual unit. 
 
In 2006, the Howard government finally drew the line, amending the Act to require that 
the AEC obtains permission from the Special Minister of State before locating a 
divisional office outside its division.15 So not only does the structure remain moribund, 
but ministerial influence has been written into the act – an unhealthy development. 
 
This characteristic of the AEC can be traced to the creation of the Electoral Office 
(strictly speaking, the Electoral Branch of the Home Affairs Department) in 1902. That 
design was in turn based on the electoral apparatus in the former colony of South 
Australia, where a particular and somewhat peculiar model had evolved. South 
Australia’s arrangements were the best in Australia (and – as it seems no other country 
actually possessed anything resembling a national electoral apparatus at the time – the 
best in the world), but a lot has changed in the last century. 
 
Having a permanent DRO who was familiar with his electorate made more sense when 
electors numbered on average two or three thousand per electorate. Today the average 
seat has over ninety thousand electors. And in some huge rural electorates the concept of 
an office of several people having a general affinity with that seat makes no sense. To 
many electors in the large divisions of Kalgoorlie (Western Australia), Grey (South 
Australia) and Kennedy (Queensland) the “local” AEC office is so far away it may as well 
be in the state capital, or even Canberra. And of course technology has revolutionised the 
way electoral rolls are – or should be – maintained. 
 
Current arrangements prevent the AEC from taking full advantage of technological 
advances. Here is just one example. For two decades the AEC has had a computerised 
electoral roll, and most enrolment activity – deleting names from the roll, sending out 
forms to prospective new enrolees or those  who have changed address – happens in the 
capital city offices. But when these millions of forms are filled in and returned to the 
commission every year, most go to a state capital office (this is the address on the supplied 
prepaid envelope). There, a clerk places each one into the pigeon-hole for the appropriate 
                                                
15 According to the AEC’s submission to a 2007 inquiry, since that legislation came into force, the “the Special Minister 
of State [has] approved the collocation of the divisional offices for Banks and Blaxland at a single site in Bankstown and 
for Fowler and Prospect at a single site in Fairfield. These collocations are expected to take place in August 2007, which 
will then increase the number of divisional offices sharing premises to 50 across 20 sites.” Note that all these are safe 
Labor seats. 
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electorate office, to which they are then sent to be entered onto computer. Yet the rolls 
are kept on a central database and could just as easily have been entered in head office. 
The reason it happens this way is, one suspects, simply to give the divisional staff 
something to do. Such are the distortions of retaining a system past its time. 
 
It cannot be denied that some valid reasons remain for the current arrangements, some of 
which were presented to the 2007 Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters 
inquiry. For example, staff members often take pride in servicing their electorate, perhaps 
(in urban areas) driving around on the way to work and taking note of new housing areas 
that might require attention. It is understandable that House of Representatives MPs 
appreciate having a one-stop contact – that one individual who they can phone – for 
matters regarding their electorate. Workers in some of the few grouped offices complain 
of impersonal, production line style arrangements that lack clearly defined 
responsibilities.16 As well, of course, change of any kind can be difficult.  
 
But a quarter of a century ago, compelling reasons were put for not allowing banks to 
install automatic teller machines. In the end the reasons for allowing it were more 
powerful. So it is with allowing the AEC to progress: the pros vastly outweigh the cons. 
 
We once led the world in enrolment matters but have recently gone backwards while 
other countries have progressed. This is true literally in the 2006 amendment to the 
Electoral Act that closed the rolls on the day the writs were issued, rather than seven days 
afterwards, just as other countries are increasingly keeping the rolls open until election 
eve or even election day. Automatic enrolment must eventually come to Australia, which 
will largely eradicate those millions of forms – and with them a large part of the DROs’ 
alleged raison d’être.17  
 
The new Labor Special Minister of State, John Faulkner, is a senator, which hopefully 
bodes well for a rational approach to the DRO problem. His colleagues in the lower 
house will complain, but let us hope reason prevails. 
 
The quotation at the top of this paper comes from a pep talk given in 1903 by the first 
Australian Chief Electoral Officer to his troops, the divisional returning officers. They 
and their offices occupied very important positions, responsible for running all electoral 
matters in their electorates. They were, as Lewis said, Kings. 
 
But here’s another observation, made eight decades later. It comes from an AEC 
employee’s evidence to a Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters inquiry: 
 
                                                
16 JSCEM (2007). Review of certain aspects of administration of the Australian Electoral Commission. 
http://www.aph.gov.au/House/committee/em/aec/index.htm 
17 See Peter Brent, ‘Time to introduce automatic enrolment in Australia, Democratic Audit of Australia, February 
2008, http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/papers/20080214brent_autoenrol.pdf    
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If you go around the divisional offices to talk to staff about something, it is most 
unusual for [a member of the public] to come into the office. They are often there 
to pay the electricity bill anyway – they have mistaken us for the electricity 
commission. 18 
 
Our Electoral Kings were once a major reason Australia led the world in running 
elections. And if the position had not existed in the past, it is likely the AEC would not be 
the fine electoral institution it is today. But as sometimes happens with hereditary 
positions, they have outlived their usefulness. It is time to end the system of permanent 
Divisional Returning Officers as we know it. 
 
 
                                                
18 JSCEM (1988), v 
